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Abstract
This paper reviews research on (a) autobiographical episodic and semantic memory, (b) 
the self-reference effect, (c) memory for the actions of self versus other (the self-
enactment effect), and (d) non-autobiographical episodic memory in autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD), and provides a theoretical framework to account for the bi-directional 
relationship between memory and the self in ASD.  It is argued that individuals with ASD 
have diminished psychological self-knowledge (as a consequence of diagnostic social and 
communication impairments), alongside intact physical self-knowledge, resulting in an 
under-elaborated self-concept.  As a result, individuals with ASD show impaired 
autobiographical episodic memory and a reduced self-reference effect (which may each 
rely on psychological aspects of the self-concept) but do not show specific impairments 
in memory for their own rather than others’ actions (which may rely on physical aspects 
of the self-concept).  However, it is also argued that memory impairments in ASD (e.g., 
in non-autobiographical episodic memory) may not be entirely accounted for in terms of 
self-related processes.  Other factors, such as deficits in memory binding, may also play a 
role.  Finally, it is argued that deficits in autobiographical episodic memory and future 
thinking may result in a diminished temporally extended self-concept in ASD.  
Keywords: (1) Autism spectrum disorder; (2) autobiographical memory; (3) episodic 
memory; (4) memory; (5) self 
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Memory and the Self in Autism: A Review and Theoretical Framework
Aspects of memory and the self are intimately and bi-directionally related.  On the one 
hand, the ability to encode and retrieve personally significant memories arguably 
presupposes a concept of self (Howe & Courage, 1993).  On the other hand, one’s sense 
of self is composed of one’s memories of past personal experiences, as well as 
knowledge of one’s traits and other personally relevant information (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; Wilson & Ross, 2003).  
It is widely accepted that there are different “types” of memory and that the self is 
not a unitary construct.  In terms of long term memory, one of the major distinctions to 
have been drawn is between episodic and semantic memory, which are thought to 
comprise functionally distinct but interacting neuro-cognitive systems (Tulving, 2001).  
Episodic memories are memories of personally experienced events that occurred in a 
particular place at a particular time.  They are uniquely associated with autonoetic 
awareness, a type of self-conscious awareness that allows one to mentally represent and 
become aware of one’s continuing existence across subjective time.  By contrast, 
semantic memories are memories of timeless, de-contextualised facts, and are 
characterised by noetic (knowing) rather than autonoetic (self-knowing) awareness 
(Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997).    
Autobiographical memory refers to memory for information pertaining to the self 
and is often considered to be synonymous with episodic memory (Gilboa, 2004).  
However, the term “episodic” refers to a distinct type of memory system, whereas the 
term “autobiographical” refers to a particular type of memory content.  Indeed, both the 
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episodic and semantic systems are capable of processing autobiographical content (Klein, 
Chan, & Loftus, 1999; Levine, 2004).  Not all episodic memories are autobiographical 
(i.e., self-relevant) in nature and, likewise, not all autobiographical (self-relevant) 
memories are episodic in nature.  It is therefore possible to distinguish between (a) 
autobiographical episodic memory (e.g., remembering what happened on one’s first day 
of secondary school); (b) non-autobiographical episodic memory (e.g., remembering 
what was reported in the newspaper this morning); (c) autobiographical semantic 
knowledge (e.g., knowledge of one’s date of birth or middle name); and (d) non-
autobiographical semantic knowledge (e.g., knowledge of the boiling point of water).  
With the exception of non-autobiographical semantic knowledge, each of these types of 
memory is arguably related to the self in some way.  
As stated above, the self is widely considered to be multifaceted (e.g., Lewis, 
1995; Neisser, 1988; Rochat, 2003).  Perhaps the most critical distinction is between the 
self as the subject of experience (the “I”) and the self as the object of experience (the
“me”) (James, 1890).  Only when the self becomes the object of experience can one be 
ascribed self-awareness.  Further refining this distinction, Butterworth (1995) argues that 
“primary” self-awareness occurs when the self is the object of one’s own perception, and 
“higher-order” self-awareness occurs when the self is the object of one’s own cognition.  
Such higher-order self-awareness is often referred to as “explicit” or “reflexive” self-
awareness.  A further key distinction, which cuts across the facets of self described 
above, is between physical and psychological aspects of self (Gillihan & Farah, 2005).  
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The Relationship Between Memory and the Self 
According to Tulving (2001), episodic memory is intimately related to the self.  
However, it is important to consider which aspects of the self are likely to be involved
and whether they are likely to be involved at the point of encoding or retrieval.  From a 
developmental perspective, Howe and Courage (1993) have argued that the emergence of 
autobiographical episodic memory in early childhood is critically dependent upon the 
development of a self-concept (which is also frequently referred to in the literature as a 
representational, categorical, or cognitive self).  The self-concept is typically regarded as 
a set of beliefs about the self (e.g., I have brown hair, I am a child, I am silly, etc.) 
(Neisser, 1988), which is presumably based on semantic autobiographical knowledge.  
Howe and Courage’s argument revolves around the idea that the self-concept acts as a 
fixed referent – a sort of category – around which personally experienced event memories 
can be organized.  Thus, without a self-concept it is not possible to encode self-relevant,
autobiographical episodic memories.  The self-concept is said to reach a “critical mass” at 
around 2 years of age, coinciding with the onset of rudimentary autobiographical episodic 
memory, and indeed there is some evidence to support this claim (Harley & Reese, 
1999).  Once the self-concept has reached this critical mass, autobiographical episodic 
memory is said to improve as the self-concept continues to become more elaborate and 
sophisticated.  
It might be argued that as well as requiring a self-concept at the point of encoding 
(in order to “tag” the memory as self-relevant), autobiographical episodic memory also 
involves the re-experiencing of the self as the object of experience (i.e., the “me”) at the 
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point of retrieval.  However, non-autobiographical episodic memory is unlikely to require 
a self-concept at the point of encoding and may merely involve re-experiencing the self 
as the subject of experience (the “I”) at retrieval.  Take for example a typical recognition 
memory task, in which one is presented with a list of words to study and then 
subsequently asked to make old-new judgments about words presented in a test list 
(including both studied and unstudied words).  One may, for example, remember that the 
word “red” appeared on the study list and also that the word red appeared after the word 
“house”.  This type of retrieval appears to involve the episodic system but encoding does 
not seem to require a self-concept (since the memory does not need to be tagged as self-
relevant) and retrieval does not seem to involve re-experiencing the self as the object of 
experience – merely re-experiencing the self as the subject of experience.  Thus, whereas 
autobiographical episodic memory necessarily requires a self-concept at encoding and 
involves re-experiencing the self as the object of experience at retrieval, non-
autobiographical episodic memory does not require a self-concept at encoding and 
involves re-experiencing the self as the subject of experience at retrieval.  If this 
characterisation is correct then autonoetic or “self-knowing” awareness, which is 
considered to be the hallmark of episodic memory, differs qualitatively between 
autobiographical and non-autobiographical episodic memory.  
The development of a self-concept is unlikely to be the only factor to play a role 
in the development of autobiographical episodic memory (Nelson & Fivush, 2004).  For 
example, developmental improvements in memory “binding” are also likely to be 
implicated in the development of autobiographical (and non-autobiographical) episodic 
memory (Sluzenski, Newcombe, & Kovacs, 2006).  Given that episodic memories 
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involve multiple features, the features comprising an episode must be linked together at 
encoding to form a coherent or “bound” representation (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996).  
Thus, featural or relational binding plays a key role in episodic encoding.  
Correspondingly, episodic retrieval involves bringing multiple features together in order 
to re-construct a coherent event representation (Baddeley, 2000).  Through enabling the 
re-construction of past episodes, episodic memory binding may enable one to mentally 
re-experience past episodes and this may entail the ability to re-experience the self as the 
subject or object of experience – i.e., allow one to become aware of a past state of self.  
Nevertheless, the development of a self-concept is likely to be a necessary (even if not a 
sufficient) step towards the emergence of autobiographical episodic memory.  
Thus, a rudimentary self-concept (based on autobiographical semantic 
knowledge), which becomes increasingly elaborate through the course of development, 
may provide the foundations necessary for a child to gradually develop a collection of 
autobiographical episodic memories, enriching their self-knowledge base.  In turn, the 
development of autobiographical episodic memory supports the emergence of a new, 
more sophisticated level of self-awareness – [temporally] extended self-awareness 
(Neisser, 1988).  A temporally extended self-concept encompasses representations of 
present, past, and future states of self, and allows one to become aware of one’s place in 
and continued existence through time (Povinelli, 2001).  Without a store of 
autobiographical episodic memories such a temporally extended self-representation 
would not be possible (Povinelli, 2001).  Here, the bidirectional relationship between 
memory and the self becomes apparent.  Given that the temporally extended self-concept
incorporates multiple, alternative representations of self that must be understood as
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alternative representations of the same enduring self, metarepresentation (Perner, 1991) 
may also be a prerequisite.  
Now that a theoretical framework for considering the typical relationship between 
memory and the self is in place, it is possible to consider how this might be applied to the 
case of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), a disorder which a number of researchers have 
suggested is characterised by diminished self-awareness (e.g., Frith, 2003; Hobson, 1990; 
Russell, 1997) and which is also characterised by a particular profile of strengths and 
weaknesses in memory (Ben Shalom, 2003; Bowler, Gaigg, & Lind, in press).  
The main body of this review is presented in four unequal parts.  First, is a main 
section on ‘The Self in ASD’. This is followed by an extended main section on ‘The 
Self and Memory in ASD’, subdivided into reviews of evidence relating to 
‘Autobiographical memory in ASD’, ‘The self-reference effect in ASD’, and ‘Memory 
for the actions of self and other in ASD’. There follows a short main section on ‘Non-
Autobiographical Episodic Memory in ASD’ and a ‘Conclusions’ section.
The Self in ASD
When considering the self in ASD, it is important to consider which aspects are typical 
and which are atypical.  It seems implausible to suggest that individuals with ASD do not 
have subjective experiences (i.e., lack an “I”, in James’, 1890, terms), although it is quite 
possible that those subjective experiences are qualitatively distinct from those of typical 
individuals.  It should be noted, however, that Powell and Jordan (1996) have argued that 
ASD involves a deficit in developing an "experiencing self", which seems to be a related 
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notion.  It is far more probable that individuals with ASD have difficulties with becoming 
self-aware (i.e., deficits in the “me”).  Precisely which aspects of self-awareness 
(primary or higher-order, physical or psychological) are problematic in ASD should also 
be considered.  
Primary self-awareness in ASD: physical and psychological aspects
Recent evidence seems to indicate that individuals with ASD have intact primary self-
awareness, at least in the physical domain.  For example, Williams and Happé (2009a) 
found that children with ASD (of mixed intellectual ability) were able to discriminate 
between internally (i.e., self) and externally caused changes in their perceptual experience 
as effectively as comparison children.  Similar results have been observed amongst high-
functioning1 adults (David et al., 2008).  These findings indicate that individuals with 
ASD are able to become perceptually aware of physical aspects of themselves.  However, 
difficulties with reciprocal social engagement in ASD seem to suggest that they have 
diminished primary awareness of psychological (or interpersonal) aspects of self 
(Hobson, 1990; Neisser, 1988; Tomasello, 1995).   
Higher-order self-awareness in ASD: physical and psychological aspects
The mark test of mirror self-recognition (Amsterdam, 1972; Gallup, 1970) is probably the 
most commonly used test of higher-order self-awareness.  The traditional version of the 
                                                
1 The terms “high-functioning” and “low-functioning” will be used to refer to individuals with full scale 
IQs of ≥ 70 and < 70, respectively.  
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task involves surreptitiously marking a child’s face with a spot of rouge and subsequently 
assessing their reaction upon seeing their reflection.  Here, mark-directed behaviour (i.e., 
touching the mark) is taken as evidence of self-recognition.  Such behaviour is shown by 
typically developing children at a mean age of 18 months (Anderson, 1983; Courage, 
Edison, & Howe, 2004).  Although there is some debate over exactly what the mark test 
measures (Hobson, 1990; Mitchell, 1997), it is generally agreed that mark-directed 
behaviour demonstrates that a child has a mental representation of what they typically 
look like – they have at least a rudimentary physical self-concept, which can become the 
object of their consciousness (Amsterdam, 1972; Neisser, 1995; Nielsen, Suddendorf, & 
Slaughter, 2006).  This implies higher-order self-awareness of physical aspects of self.  
Four studies have assessed mirror self-recognition in ASD, in each case 
employing children with ages ranging from 3.5 to 12.7 years (Dawson & McKissick, 
1984; Ferrari & Matthews, 1983; Neuman & Hill, 1978; Spiker & Ricks, 1984).  In three 
of these studies, the children appear to have had intellectual disability (in the fourth
study, the intellectual ability level was not specified)2.  In each of these studies, the 
majority of children with ASD (between 53% and 86% across studies) showed mirror 
self-recognition.  Although a minority of participants in all the studies failed to show 
mark-directed behaviour, given that appropriate control groups and intelligence measures 
were not included, it is unclear whether this failure was due to an ASD-specific deficit or 
intellectual disability. Indeed, these studies included children with severe to profound 
intellectual disability, who may have had mental ages of less than 18 months.  In future 
                                                
2 Dawson and McKissick’s (1984) sample had a mean IQ of 57; Ferrari and Matthews’ (1983) sample was 
described as severely to profoundly mentally retarded; Neuman and Hill (1978) did not specify the 
intellectual ability level of their sample; Spiker and Ricks’ (1984) sample were said to have severely 
impaired language.  
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studies, it will be important to establish whether children with ASD are impaired relative 
to mental age rather than merely chronological age.  
Although the evidence is not clear-cut, mirror self-recognition appears to be a 
relative strength for individuals with ASD (even seemingly low-functioning individuals).  
This suggests that they have higher-order physical self-awareness.  Further supporting 
this suggestion, studies have shown that children with ASD (both high-functioning and 
mixed ability) do not significantly differ from age and verbal ability matched comparison 
children in terms of their ability to recognise delayed video images of themselves (Lind 
& Bowler, 2009a).  Such findings may be taken as evidence of intact (higher-order) 
temporally extended physical self-awareness but do not necessarily imply intact (higher-
order) temporally extended psychological self-awareness (see Lind & Bowler, 2009a).   
Evidence from a number of sources suggests that individuals with ASD have 
diminished higher-order awareness of psychological aspects of self.  For example, it is 
widely acknowledged that children with ASD have difficulty using first person pronouns 
such as “I” and “me” (Jordan, 1996; Lee, Hobson, & Chiat, 1994; Lind & Bowler, 
2009a).   Moreover, individuals with ASD (even high-functioning individuals) also show 
diminished conscious awareness of their own emotions (Ben Shalom et al., 2006; Silani 
et al., 2008), mental states (Williams & Happé, in press, 2009b), and autistic traits 
(Johnson, Filliter, & Murphy, 2009).  Together, these findings suggest that children with 
ASD may have impoverished or atypical higher-order psychological self-awareness 
(alongside comparatively intact higher-order physical self-awareness).  
It seems likely that deficits in higher-order psychological self-awareness are a 
downstream consequence of the social and communication impairments that characterise 
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ASD.  Social and communication impairments significantly reduce opportunities for 
effective social engagement and consequently opportunities to acquire psychological self-
knowledge (Neisser, 1988).  However, such impairments would be unlikely to impact 
upon opportunities to acquire physical self-knowledge.  
In summary, individuals with ASD appear to have impaired self-awareness at 
both the primary and higher-order levels in the psychological, but not physical, domain.  
This would seem to imply that they lack self-knowledge in the psychological domain and 
therefore have less elaborate self-concepts than individuals without ASD. If this is the 
case, it should become apparent in studies of autobiographical semantic knowledge 
(which arguably directly taps the self-concept) and autobiographical episodic memory 
(which arguably relies on a self-concept).  The following sections review studies which
shed light on the interrelation between memory and the self in ASD.  Studies of 
autobiographical (semantic and episodic) memory, the self-reference effect, memory for 
the actions of self versus other, and (non-autobiographical) episodic memory are 
considered.  
The Self and Memory in ASD
Autobiographical memory in ASD
Goddard, Howlin, Dritschel, and Patel (2007) assessed autobiographical memory in 37 
high-functioning young adults with ASD, and 39 typical comparison adults, matched for 
age, verbal IQ (VIQ), performance IQ (PIQ), and full scale IQ (FSIQ), using a cueing 
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task and a social problem solving task.  The cueing task involved presenting a series of 
cue words (e.g., “leisure”), designed to elicit memories of specific past personal 
experiences.  The social problem solving task involved presenting short stories describing 
various social problems (e.g., falling out with friends).  In this task, participants were first 
of all asked to describe the sequence of steps required to solve the problem at hand, in 
order to achieve a specified goal (e.g., how to make up with friends), and subsequently 
asked to report any thoughts or images that came to them during the problem solving 
process.  In this respect, the task incidentally provided an opportunity to report specific 
past personal experiences.
It was found that in the cueing task, participants with ASD generated significantly 
fewer specific event memories than comparison participants, and were also significantly 
slower at doing so.  With respect to the social problem solving task, it was found that 
although participants within each group were equally likely to report thoughts/images 
following the problem solving activity, these thoughts/images were significantly less 
likely to comprise memories of specific personal experiences within the ASD group than 
within the comparison group.  These results suggest that high-functioning adults with 
ASD have impaired autobiographical episodic memory.   
Further evidence for an ASD-specific impairment in autobiographical episodic 
memory is provided by a study of children’s narrative abilities (Losh & Capps, 2003).  
Participants were asked to describe past personal experiences (e.g., “Can you tell me a 
specific time you went on vacation?”) and also to describe the ongoing events in a picture 
book.  When compared to age and verbal IQ matched typically developing children, high-
functioning children with ASD were found to have few difficulties with narrating the 
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book, but showed significantly impoverished narratives of personal experiences.  The 
children with ASD produced a greater number of bizarre or irrelevant responses than 
comparison children, and were more heavily reliant on prompting.  The fact that (in this 
particular study) participants with ASD did not have difficulty in narrating the picture 
book suggests that it was not their narrative skills per se that were the limiting factor in 
reporting personal experiences but rather the (autobiographical episodic) content of what 
they were attempting to describe.  
A recent study by Lind and Bowler (2009b, under review) indicates that 
individuals with ASD not only demonstrate impaired autobiographical episodic memory
but also impaired autobiographical episodic future thinking.  Episodic future thinking (or 
“prospection”) involves mentally projecting oneself into the future in order to “pre-
experience” a possible future episode, and is thought to be at least partially underpinned 
by the episodic memory system (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Wheeler et al., 1997).  
Indeed, recent neuropsychological (Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009) and behavioural (Busby 
& Suddendorf, 2005; D'Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008) evidence supports 
this hypothesis.  Lind and Bowler asked 14 high-functioning adults with ASD and 14 
typical comparison adults (who were matched for age, VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ) to try to 
remember a series of events that happened to them in the past and imagine a series of
events that might happen to them in the future.  It was found that participants with ASD 
remembered and imagined significantly fewer specific past and future experiences than 
comparison participants, suggesting that both autobiographical episodic memory and
future thinking are impaired in ASD.  
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The studies described above demonstrate that autobiographical episodic memory 
and future thinking are diminished in ASD, but what about autobiographical semantic 
knowledge?  Klein et al. (1999) report a case study of R.J., a 21-year-old high-
functioning individual with ASD.  They found that R.J. had detailed semantic knowledge 
of his personality traits but had great difficulty in generating episodic memories of 
occasions when he had demonstrated those traits.  For instance, although he knew that he 
was friendly, when asked to recall a particular time when he had been friendly he 
encountered severe difficulties.  In contrast to three typical individuals (with 
chronological ages similar to R.J.’s mental age), who generated autobiographical episodic 
memories 100% of the time, R.J. could only generate such recollections 20% of the time.  
Thus, R.J. appeared to possess intact autobiographical semantic knowledge but impaired 
autobiographical episodic memory.  Although this represents a potentially important 
finding, results from such case studies do not necessarily generalise.  However, two 
recent studies have sought to further investigate both autobiographical semantic 
knowledge and autobiographical episodic memory in ASD.     
Crane and Goddard (2008) compared the performance of 15 high-functioning 
adults with ASD and 15 typical comparison adults (who were matched for age, VIQ, PIQ, 
and FSIQ) on autobiographical (a) interview, (b) fluency, and (c) narrative tasks.  In the 
autobiographical interview, autobiographical episodic memory and autobiographical 
semantic knowledge were assessed with questions such as, “Can you tell me something 
that happened while you were at primary school that stands out in your mind?” and “Can 
you tell me the names of two of your teachers from primary school?” respectively.  The 
autobiographical fluency task involved asking participants to generate as many events 
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(measuring autobiographical episodic memory) and people’s names (measuring 
autobiographical semantic knowledge), from specified lifetime periods, as possible in a 
90 second period.  Letter and category fluency were also assessed.  The autobiographical 
narrative task involved questions such as “What did you do for your last birthday?” 
designed to elicit detailed descriptions of autobiographical episodic memories.  The 
results from the interview task indicated no significant group differences in either 
autobiographical episodic memory or autobiographical semantic knowledge.  However, 
on the fluency task the ASD group performed significantly less well, specifically on the 
autobiographical episodic memory element.  There were no significant group differences 
in performance on either the autobiographical semantic knowledge element or the letter 
or category fluency tasks (ruling out generativity-based explanations of the findings).  
With respect to the narrative task, no qualitative group differences were observed, 
although the ASD group were found to produce significantly fewer specific
autobiographical episodic memories.  As a whole, the results of this study suggest that 
autobiographical episodic memory is impaired in high-functioning adults with ASD, 
whilst autobiographical semantic knowledge is intact.  
Bruck, London, Landa, and Goodman (2007) assessed these two aspects of 
memory using an autobiographical memory questionnaire in a sample of 30 high-
functioning children with ASD and 38 typically developing children.  The questionnaire 
included items to assess knowledge of personal facts (e.g., “What’s your mother’s 
name?”) and memory for personally experienced events (e.g., “What happened at your 
last birthday party?”).  They were also asked a series of yes-no life event questions such 
as “Have you ever been on an aeroplane?”  In line with Crane and Goddard’s (2008) 
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results, children with ASD showed significantly poorer performance than typically 
developing children on the questions assessing memory for personally experienced events 
(autobiographical episodic memory).  However, in contrast to Crane and Goddard’s 
(2008) results, participants with ASD also showed significantly poorer performance on 
the questions assessing knowledge of personal facts.  The groups performed equally well 
on the yes-know life event questions3.  The absence of a performance deficit in the ASD 
group may be attributable to the fact that these questions did not demand the retrieval of 
any episodic, contextual details (for example, a child may know that they have been on an 
aeroplane without remembering any event details).  Thus, autobiographical semantic 
knowledge may have been sufficient.  These results suggest that some elements of 
autobiographical semantic knowledge are intact in children with ASD, whilst others may 
be impaired.  However, it should be noted that although the groups in this study were 
matched for age, the typically developing group had a significantly higher mean full scale 
IQ than the ASD group.  This IQ decrement could potentially account for any significant 
group differences.   
The results of a study by Lee and Hobson (1998) shed additional light on the 
autobiographical semantic knowledge of children with ASD. Damon and Hart’s (1988) 
self-understanding interview, which assesses various domains of self-knowledge, was 
administered to a group of 12 adolescents with ASD who had low verbal ability and 10 
age- and verbal ability-matched comparison adolescents.  The interview can be 
considered as an index of autobiographical semantic knowledge rather than 
autobiographical episodic memory, given that is does not require participants to recount 
                                                
3 Although the statistics for the main effect of group on performance were not reported in the paper itself, 
M. Bruck (personal communication) kindly confirmed that the group difference in performance was not 
significant.  
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specific past personal experiences.  It was found that participants with ASD produced 
significantly more, but qualitatively similar, descriptions of their physical and active 
characteristics, relative to comparison participants.  However, their self-descriptive 
statements of psychological and social characteristics differed qualitatively from those of 
comparison participants and in the latter instance quantitatively, in that they produced 
significantly fewer descriptions that fell into the social category.  It seems likely that such 
“person-related” difficulties reflect the underlying social impairments that characterise 
ASD.  Nevertheless, these findings suggest that at least certain aspects of semantic 
autobiographical knowledge are atypical in children with ASD and seem to suggest 
specific deficits in psychological but not physical aspects of the self-concept.  
Overall, the studies described above indicate that autobiographical episodic 
memory is impaired in both adults and children with ASD, whereas autobiographical 
semantic knowledge (which may index the self-concept) is impaired only amongst 
children with ASD.  This seems to suggest that self-concept development is delayed 
(even in relation to mental age) in ASD but, by adulthood, (at least high-functioning) 
individuals appear to have “caught up” to some extent.  
Goddard et al. (2007) have argued that individuals with ASD have impairments in 
autobiographical episodic memory as a result of poorly elaborated or perhaps fragmented 
self-concepts, which provide insufficient structure around which to organize personally 
experienced event memories or with which to tag information as self-relevant.  Such an 
account could potentially explain why adults with ASD have difficultly with 
remembering events from childhood (when they had diminished self-concepts) but may 
not fully explain why they also have difficulty remembering events from adulthood
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(when they appear to have relatively intact self-concepts and should not therefore have 
difficulty encoding information in relation to the self).  It is possible, however, that
impairments in autobiographical semantic knowledge/self-concept development in 
childhood impact upon autobiographical episodic memory development in such as way 
that the effects persist through to adulthood.      
Alternatively, autobiographical episodic memory may be impaired in ASD for 
reasons other than (or in addition to) a diminished self-concept.  For example, it is 
possible that established impairments in relational memory (Gaigg, Gardiner, & Bowler, 
2008) mean that individuals with ASD have difficulty binding together disparate event 
elements to produce coherent episodic memory traces.  This explanation also predicts
impairments in non-autobiographical episodic memory.  Non-autobiographical episodic 
memory will be considered later.  First, however, studies of the self-reference effect in 
ASD will be reviewed.      
Studies of the self-reference effect provide a direct test of the capacity of 
individuals with ASD to encode material in relation to the self-concept and may provide 
further evidence regarding whether or not individuals with ASD have intact self-
concepts/autobiographical semantic memory.  In this respect, they provide an indirect 
insight into whether autobiographical episodic memory difficulties can feasibly be 
accounted for by a diminished self-concept.  
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The self-reference effect in ASD
It is well established that typical individuals show enhanced memory for information that 
is self-relevant or encoded in relation to the self (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; 
Symons & Johnson, 1997).  This phenomenon, which is known as the self-reference 
effect, may viewed as an extension of the depth-of-processing effect (Craik & Tulving, 
1975).  The notion of depth-of-processing assumes that retrieval is a function of trace 
elaboration at the time of encoding, such that the deeper or more elaborate the encoding 
process, the more likely the information is to be later retrieved.  For example, 
phonologically processed items are retained less well than semantically processed items, 
which have been encoded at a deeper level.  The self is thought to act as a conceptual 
structure with elaborative and organisational properties that enhance the deep encoding of 
information within memory (Klein & Loftus, 1988; Symons & Johnson, 1997).  
Therefore, if individuals with ASD have a diminished or poorly integrated concept of self 
(i.e., impaired autobiographical semantic knowledge), there is reason to predict that they 
will show a reduced or absent self-reference effect (Toichi et al., 2002).
In one study, Toichi et al. (2002) investigated the depth-of-processing and self-
reference effects in a sample of 18 high-functioning adults with ASD, as well as 18 
comparison adults (matched for age, VIQ and PIQ).  During the study phase of their 
experiment, participants were presented with a series of 30 target personality trait 
adjectives.  Immediately prior to the presentation of each target word, participants were 
asked one of three types of question, each of which was designed to induce either 
phonological (“Does the word rhyme with - ?”), semantic (“Is the meaning of the word 
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similar to - ?”), or self-referential (“Does the word describe you?”) processing of the 
target word.  The study phase was followed by an immediate, surprise recognition test in 
which participants were presented with a list including the 30 target words as well as 60 
distractor words, and asked to select the 30 target words that they had been presented 
with during the study phase.  The results indicated that the comparison group showed 
typical levels-of-processing (phonological < semantic) and self-reference effects 
(semantic < self-referential), whereas the ASD group, whilst showing a levels-of-
processing effect (phonological < semantic), did not show a self-reference effect 
(semantic  self-referential).  However, there were no significant between-group 
differences in recognition of either semantically or self-referentially processed words.  
Thus, although the ASD group showed an atypical pattern of performance, in failing to 
show a self-reference effect, their ability to encode material self-referentially was not 
significantly poorer than that of comparison participants.  
These results should be interpreted with caution, however, given that the 
particular measure of recognition memory used was potentially inadequate.  Toichi et al. 
(2002) used hit rate - i.e., the proportion of target items correctly identified as old - as 
their measure of recognition memory.  However, hit rate offers an incomplete picture of 
recognition memory, summarising performance on target item trials without taking into 
account performance on distractor item trials.  A complete picture of performance on yes-
no recognition tests can only be obtained through using measures (such as D' or A') that 
take into account both hit rate and false alarm rate – i.e., the proportion of distractor items 
incorrectly identified as old (e.g., Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988).  As such, Toichi et al.’s 
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results provide a potentially biased reflection of recognition memory performance that 
may not prove to be reliable.  
In a more recent study, Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright, and Baron-Cohen 
(2007) used another variant of the typical depth of processing paradigm to test 30 high-
functioning adults with ASD and 30 comparison adults (matched for age, VIQ, PIQ, and 
FSIQ).  During the study phase, participants were asked to judge, on a scale of 1 to 6, 
how descriptive a series of trait adjectives were of either (a) themselves, (b) their best 
friend, or (c) the fictional character, Harry Potter.  As a control condition, participants 
were asked to (d) judge the number of syllables contained in particular trait labels.  
Following a filled 30 minute delay, a surprise recognition test was administered.  Item 
recognition was ascertained according to participants’ confidence judgements regarding 
whether test items (including target and distractor items) were old.  Confidence scores of 
1 to 3 were deemed “new” judgements and scores of 4 to 6 were deemed “old” 
judgements.  D' scores were subsequently calculated.  It was found that participants with 
ASD performed at similar levels to comparison participants in the Syllable Judgement 
and Harry Potter conditions, but performed significantly less well in the Self and Best 
Friend conditions.  Both groups showed depth-of-processing and, unlike in Toichi et al.’s 
sample, self-reference effects (Syllable < Harry Potter < Best Friend < Self).  In order to 
investigate possible group differences in the magnitude of the self-reference effect, 
difference scores were calculated for (a) Self versus Best Friend and (b) Self versus Harry 
Potter.  The difference scores for Self versus Best Friend were almost identical for both 
groups.  However, the group difference in difference scores for Self versus Harry Potter 
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approached significance and a moderate effect size (p = .07, Cohen’s d = .49), reflecting 
the fact that the ASD group showed a somewhat smaller self-reference effect.  
Using a similar paradigm, Henderson et al. (2009) assessed a sample of 31 high-
functioning children with ASD and 31 comparison children (matched for age, VIQ, and 
PIQ).  In this study, three encoding conditions were used: participants were presented 
with a series of trait adjectives and asked either (a) “Does this word contain seven or 
more letters?” (designed to elicit featural level processing); (b) “Does this word describe 
something about Harry Potter?”; or (c) “Does this word describe something about you?”  
The results closely mirrored those obtained by Toichi et al.  In terms of D' scores, it was 
found that participants with ASD did not differ significantly from comparison 
participants in any of the three conditions.  However, whereas comparison participants 
showed depth-of-processing and self-reference effects (Featural < Harry Potter < Self), 
participants with ASD showed a depth-of-processing effect (Featural < Harry 
Potter/Self), but not a significant self-reference effect (Harry Potter  Self).  Furthermore, 
a regression analysis of Self versus Harry Potter difference scores revealed that children 
with ASD showed a significantly smaller self-reference effect than comparison children.
Thus, both Lombardo et al. (2007) and Henderson et al. (2009) found that 
individuals with ASD show smaller self-reference effects than comparison individuals, 
suggesting that they show a diminution in self-referential processing.  However, whereas 
Henderson et al. (2009) found that children with ASD did not show the self-reference 
effect at all, Lombardo et al.’s (2007) found that adults with ASD showed the self-
reference effect to some extent.  In some respects, these results appear to mirror those 
observed in the studies of autobiographical semantic knowledge, described above.  In 
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each case, the results seem to imply that whereas children with ASD have impaired self-
concepts, adults with ASD do not (or have at least compensated to some extent, enabling 
some degree of self-referential encoding).  
One key point to note is that the studies of self-referential memory, described 
above, required participants to make judgements about personality trait adjectives (e.g.,
clever, funny, cranky, etc.).  This would seem to require encoding in relation to 
psychological aspects of the self-concept – precisely the facet of the self-concept that is 
hypothesized to be diminished in ASD.  It would be interesting to test self-referential 
encoding in relation to physical trait adjectives.  In this case, performance differences 
between individuals with and without ASD would not be predicted.    
Moreover, the extent to which the performance diminution is specific to the self is 
somewhat unclear, given that participants with ASD in Lombardo et al.’s study also 
performed significantly less well than comparison participants in the Best Friend 
condition (unfortunately Henderson et al. did not include this condition).  This would 
seem to suggest that individuals with ASD have difficulty with using both self and other 
as organising structures within memory, perhaps reflecting poorly integrated or 
elaborated psychological concepts of self and (close) others.  It seems likely that the 
social-communicative deficits that characterise ASD impact upon the capacity to acquire 
both psychological self-knowledge and psychological knowledge of others, resulting in 
under-elaborated concepts of self and others.  The ability to acquire psychological 
knowledge of Harry Potter does not depend on dynamic social interaction – it depends on 
passively reading books or watching films.  Hence, individuals with ASD should be able 
to form a typical “Harry Potter concept”.  This may explain why individuals with ASD in 
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Lombardo et al.’s study showed diminished recognition memory in the Best Friend and 
Self conditions but not the Harry Potter condition.  
Another aspect of the results of these studies of self-referential memory that may 
warrant further attention concerns why participants with ASD did not show blanket 
memory deficits, relative to comparison participants, across all conditions.  Although 
performance on recognition memory tasks typically involves contributions from both 
episodic and semantic memory, given that single item memory (rather than memory for 
context) is sufficient for successful performance on these particular tasks, episodic 
memory need not be invoked (e.g., Wheeler et al., 1997).  Thus, successful performance 
on such single item recognition tests does not imply intact episodic memory.  However, 
performance on Lombardo et al.’s (2007) and Henderson et al.’s (2009) tasks does 
depend on intact non-autobiographical semantic memory at test, for all conditions, and 
for the self condition, intact autobiographical semantic knowledge (i.e., a well developed 
self-concept) at the time of encoding.  Thus, the results (at minimum) are indicative of 
intact non-autobiographical semantic knowledge but impaired autobiographical semantic 
knowledge.    
Memory for the actions of self versus other in ASD
It is well established that typically developing individuals show superior memory for self-
performed actions as opposed to other-person-performed actions (e.g., Baker-Ward, Hess, 
& Flannagan, 1990) – a pattern of performance that may be referred to as the “self-
enactment effect”.  One explanation for this retrieval advantage is that it is an extension 
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of the self-reference effect, such that the relatively elaborate self-concept acts as a richer, 
more effective structure for encoding than does the relatively less elaborate other-person-
concept.  Therefore, if individuals with ASD have under-elaborated self-concepts, they 
should show a reduced or absent memory advantage for self-performed actions (e.g., 
Hare, Mellor, & Azmi, 2007).  A number of studies of ASD have compared memory for 
the actions of self and others.  
One of the most frequently cited studies of memory for self and other in ASD was 
conducted by Millward, Powell, Messer, and Jordan (2000).  Free and cued recall of 
activities, such as buying sweets from a shop or visiting horses in a sanctuary, performed 
either by self or by an accompanying peer, was assessed in a sample of 12 children with 
ASD (with low verbal ability) and 12 typically developing children, who were matched 
for verbal mental age (Study 1).  The results indicated that participants with ASD recalled 
significantly fewer event details for self-performed activities than comparison 
participants, but there were no between-group differences in recall of peer-performed 
activities.  In terms of within-group patterns of performance, the comparison group 
showed significantly better recall for self-performed activities than peer-performed 
activities (self-enactment effect), whilst the ASD group demonstrated the opposite 
pattern, showing significantly better recall for peer-performed activities than self-
performed activities.  On the basis of these results, the authors concluded that 
“individuals with autism have a specific difficulty in the recall of personally experienced 
events” (p.24).  However, this interpretation may not be entirely justified.  
Although the ASD and typically developing groups were matched on verbal 
mental age, the ASD group had a mean chronological age that was more than 7 years 
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above that of the comparison group.  Thus, it is possible that between-group differences 
in levels and patterns of performance on the experimental task can be accounted for by 
the difference in verbal intelligence (the mean verbal IQs of the ASD and comparison 
groups can be estimated at 53 and 107, respectively) rather than by ASD-specific deficits.  
In an attempt to overcome this limitation of the study, Millward et al. (2000) 
conducted a second study in which they assessed a sample of children with intellectual
disability who, like the ASD group in Study 1, had lower verbal mental ages than 
chronological ages.  However, in Study 2 no ASD or typically developing groups were 
included, and the group with intellectual disability in Study 2 was not comparable to the 
ASD or typically developing groups from Study 1, in terms of either verbal mental age or 
chronological age.  Moreover, the group tested in Study 2 experienced a different set of 
events in different locations to those used in the first study.  Therefore, any comparisons 
between the findings of Study 1 and Study 2 are unlikely to be informative. 
More recently, Hare et al. (2007) used a “table-top tasks” paradigm to compare 
free and cued recall of self- versus other-performed actions amongst 12 low-functioning 
adults with ASD and 14 adults with intellectual disability, who were matched on 
receptive vocabulary and grammar.  It was found that participants with ASD did not 
significantly differ from participants with intellectual disability in terms of either their 
free recall or cued recall of actions, and both groups showed a free and cued recall 
advantage for self-performed actions over other-performed actions.
Farrant, Blades, and Boucher (1998) assessed memory for self and other in a 
sample of 15 children with ASD (with low verbal ability), 15 typically developing 
children matched for verbal mental age, and 15 children with intellectual disability 
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matched for chronological and verbal mental age, using a task that involved the 
experimenter and participant listening to an audio recording, which instructed either “the 
person holding the red block” or “the person holding the blue block” (referring to either 
the experimenter or participant) to repeat single words aloud.  After 28 instructions from 
the recording, and a short delay, the child was given a surprise recognition and source 
memory test.  They were asked if particular (target and distractor) words were “old” or 
“new”. For the words they identified as old, they were asked who had spoken the word 
aloud.  Although the authors did not compare recognition memory accuracy for “self” 
and “other” words within or between the groups, it was found that within all groups, the 
proportion of correctly recognized “self” words correctly attributed to the self, and the 
proportion of correctly recognized “other” words correctly attributed to the experimenter 
did not significantly differ – that is, none of the groups showed a self-enactment effect in 
self-other source memory.  This same pattern of performance was confirmed in a 
replication study of children with ASD who had moderately impaired verbal ability 
(Hala, Rasmussen, and Henderson, 2005).  
Russell and Jarrold (1999, Experiment 1) tested a sample of 22 children with ASD 
(with low verbal ability) using a task in which experimenter and child took turns to place 
a total of 24 picture cards onto a picture lotto board, either on their own behalf or on the 
behalf of a designated doll “partner”.  Afterwards, the child had to remember with whom 
each card had originated and return the card to that person (themselves/experimenter) or 
doll (their doll/experimenter’s doll).  It was found that relative to verbal ability matched 
typically developing children and children with intellectual disability, children with ASD 
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generally performed less well on the task, and also showed a different pattern of 
performance to the comparison groups.    
For the current purposes, the most significant finding was that both comparison 
groups were better at remembering the correct origin of the cards they had placed on the 
board themselves (i.e., their cards + their doll partner’s cards) than of the cards they had 
observed the experimenter place (i.e., experimenter’s cards + experimenter’s doll 
partner’s cards) (with the difference reaching significance in the group with learning 
disability but not the typically developing group), whereas the ASD group were 
significantly better at remembering the correct origin of the cards they had observed the 
experimenter place on the board than of the cards they had placed themselves.  Thus, 
whereas the comparison groups showed a self-advantage, the ASD group showed an 
other-advantage.  
Williams and Happé (2009a) recently failed to replicate Russell and Jarrold’s 
(1999) findings.  They used a slightly modified version of the original task, in which 32 
rather than 24 picture cards were used, to test a sample of 16 children with ASD (of 
mixed intellectual ability) and 16 comparison children (who were matched on age, VIQ, 
and PIQ).  It was found that participants with ASD showed both a similar level and 
pattern of performance to comparison participants.  Neither of the groups showed a self-
enactment effect, with both groups showing no significant difference in memory for the 
origins of their own (i.e., their cards + their doll partner’s cards) and the experimenter’s 
(i.e., experimenter’s cards + experimenter’s doll partner’s cards) cards (D. Williams, 
personal communication).  
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Finally, Lind and Bowler (2009c) assessed recognition and self-other source 
memory in a group of 53 children with ASD, who had mixed levels of verbal ability, and 
50 comparison children (matched on age and verbal ability).  The experimental task 
involved a picture naming game in which the experimenter and participant took turns to 
pick up and name picture cards.  Following a two minute filled delay, recognition and 
self-other source memory were assessed.  It was found that although participants with 
ASD showed similar levels of recognition memory to comparison participants, they 
showed significantly diminished source memory.  However, crucially, it was found that 
both groups showed the same pattern of performance, with better recognition and source 
memory for items originally picked up and named by the child rather than the 
experimenter.  
Clearly, studies of memory for self and other in ASD have produced mixed 
results.  However, only two out of the seven studies outlined above found qualitatively 
distinct patterns of performance amongst participants with ASD, and the validity of the 
methods used in one of these studies was questioned.  The remaining five studies have 
either found no difference between memory for self and other amongst participants with 
and without ASD or have found a typical self-enactment effect amongst participants with 
and without ASD.  Thus, the weight of the evidence seems to suggest that individuals 
with ASD do not differ from individuals without ASD with respect to memory for the 
actions of self versus other.  
In contrast to the studies of the self-reference effect, these results seem to suggest 
that individuals with ASD have self-concepts that have reached the “critical mass” 
necessary for encoding/retrieving self-relevant information.  This may be because 
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encoding, in this case, occurs in relation to physical (which are hypothesized to be intact 
in ASD) rather than psychological aspects of the self-concept and relies only on higher-
order (or perhaps even primary) self-awareness of physical (or action based) aspects of 
self.
Non-autobiographical Episodic Memory in ASD
It is now well established that individuals with ASD have impaired non-autobiographical 
episodic memory (Ben Shalom, 2003; Bowler, Gaigg, & Lind, in press).  As explained 
above, episodic and semantic memory are associated with autonoetic (self-knowing) and 
noetic (knowing) awareness, respectively.  These states of awareness are readily 
distinguished by individuals when retrieving memories.  Episodic (autonoetic) retrieval, 
or remembering, is associated with a rich recollective experience in which one has a 
feeling of re-living the previously experienced event.  Semantic (noetic) retrieval, or 
knowing, is associated with a feeling of familiarity but no sense of re-living a past 
episode.  This ability to distinguish between autonoetic and noetic states of awareness 
may be exploited in order to investigate the relative contributions of episodic and 
semantic memory, respectively, to performance on memory tasks.  In the traditional 
“remember-know” paradigm (Tulving, 1985), participants complete a standard 
recognition memory test and, for each test item they identify as old, they are asked to 
state whether they actually remember the item being presented at study or just know that 
it was presented at study.  Typical individuals tend to provide a mixture of remember and 
know responses in recognition tests, reflecting the contribution of both episodic and 
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semantic memory to task performance.  Thus, if individuals with ASD have impaired 
episodic memory, they should show less remembering and more knowing in such tests.    
Bowler, Gardiner, and Grice (2000) used a remember-know test to assess the 
relative contributions of episodic and semantic memory to the recognition memory 
performance of high-functioning adults with ASD.  Participants studied a list of 24 low-
frequency and 24 high-frequency words.  During the test phase, participants were asked 
to make remember-know judgements for items identified as old, and also to provide 
justifications of their responses (helping to ensure that reports corresponded to genuine 
instances of remembering or knowing).  It was found that the ASD and comparison 
groups (who were matched for age, VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ) showed almost identical levels 
of item recognition.  However, the ASD group provided significantly fewer remember 
responses and significantly more know responses than the comparison group.  This 
suggests that individuals with ASD are significantly less likely to retrieve rich, episodic 
trace information and to become autonoetically aware of their memories.  
It could potentially be argued that remember-know judgments might not reflect 
the same underlying processes amongst individuals with ASD as amongst typical 
individuals – that is, amongst individuals with ASD, remember responses may not 
correspond to true instances of autonoetic awareness and know responses may not 
correspond to true instances of noetic awareness.  However, Bowler et al. (2000) found 
that both groups showed a word frequency effect – they were more likely to give 
remember responses to recognised low-frequency words than to recognised high-
frequency words.  The fact that individuals with ASD respond to such experimental 
manipulations in the same way as comparison participants provides reassurance that their
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remember-know judgments do reflect genuine instances of autonoetic/noetic awareness.  
These findings therefore suggest quantitative rather than qualitative differences between 
the groups.  
These findings provide some of the clearest evidence for non-autobiographical 
episodic memory difficulties in ASD and imply that people with ASD experience 
autonoetic awareness less frequently than people without ASD.  Given that performance 
on such remember-know recognition memory tasks does not require material to be 
processed self-referentially (although it is possible that participants may incidentally do 
so on occasion), it seems highly unlikely that the encoding of material requires a self-
concept.  Therefore, deficits on non-autobiographical episodic memory tasks, such as 
these, cannot be taken as evidence for diminished self-concepts in ASD.  
It was argued above that whereas autobiographical episodic retrieval necessarily 
involves re-experiencing the self as the object of experience (the “me”), non-
autobiographical episodic retrieval involves re-experiencing the self as the subject of 
experience (the “I”).  Thus, deficits in non-autobiographical episodic memory are 
primarily likely to reflect deficits in re-experiencing the self as the subject of experience.  
However, it is important to note that although these findings suggests that individuals 
with ASD have difficulty re-experiencing themselves as the subject of experience, they 
do not imply that individuals with ASD do not experience themselves as the subject of 
experience (i.e., have subjective experiences) online.  
One plausible explanation for these deficits in re-experiencing past states of self is 
that individuals with ASD have an impaired capacity for memory binding.  If an 
individual is unable to effectively link together event features in order to reconstruct a 
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past episode, they simply cannot mentally re-experience that past episode in order to 
become aware of a past state of self.  Recent evidence suggests that individuals with ASD 
have significant difficulties with such binding.  Bowler, Gaigg, and Gardiner (2008) 
found that high-functioning adults with ASD showed undiminished recognition memory, 
relative to comparison adults (matched for age, VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ), when required to 
identify items on the basis of single features (e.g., shape) but showed significantly 
diminished performance when required to identify items on the basis of combinations of 
features (e.g., colour and shape), which relies on episodic binding.  
Conclusions
At the outset of this paper, it was argued that aspects of memory and the self are bi-
directionally related.   For example, the typical development of autobiographical episodic 
memory may depend on the emergence of a rudimentary self-concept, which is itself 
based on autobiographical semantic knowledge; and the emergence of a more 
sophisticated, temporally extended self-concept may depend on the development of 
autobiographical episodic memory (and episodic future thinking).  
Research seems to indicate that certain aspects of autobiographical semantic 
knowledge may be impaired amongst children with ASD, implying that individuals with 
ASD have self-concepts, particularly in the psychological domain, which are 
impoverished relative to individuals without ASD.  The fact that such deficits appear to 
selectively affect psychological but not physical aspects of the self-concept may reflect 
the fact that the acquisition of psychological autobiographical semantic knowledge 
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depends on social factors (Neisser, 1988).  The fact that individuals with ASD 
characteristically exhibit marked social and communication impairments may, therefore, 
limit their opportunities for acquiring psychological self-knowledge (Lind & Bowler, 
2008).  
Whether or not impairments in autobiographical episodic memory are the 
consequence of an impaired self-concept in ASD remains an empirical question, given 
that no studies have directly addressed this issue.  However, studies of self-referential 
memory provide indirect insight.  Although self-referential memory tasks do not 
necessarily tap autobiographical episodic memory, they do shed light on the capacity to 
encode information as “self-relevant”.  Studies typically indicate that adults and children 
with ASD show a diminished self-reference effect.  Individuals with ASD are likely to 
have a corresponding difficulty with encoding information as self-relevant in episodic 
memory.  Given that such self-referential memory tasks require self-referential encoding 
in relation to psychological aspects of the self-concept, these results are consistent with 
the suggestion of specific deficits in these aspects of the self-concept in ASD.  
In terms of memory for the actions of self versus other, the majority of the 
evidence indicates that individuals with ASD show patterns of performance that are 
qualitatively similar to those of individuals without ASD, suggesting that the self acts as 
a similarly effective organising structure in memory for individuals with and without 
ASD.  This, it is argued, is due to the fact that the self-enactment effect in memory 
depends only upon higher-order (or even primary) physical self-awareness which appears 
relatively undiminished in ASD.    
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The majority of the evidence suggests that individuals with ASD have 
impairments in autobiographical episodic memory and episodic future thinking.  The fact 
that individuals with ASD seem to have diminished memory for past personal 
experiences and a diminished capacity for simulating possible future experiences and,
therefore, for re-experiencing past states of self or pre-experiencing future states of self,
implies that they have a diminished sense of self, of personal history, and of personal 
continuity through time.  Attenuated temporally extended self-awareness would seem to 
be an inevitable consequence of attenuated autobiographical episodic memory and future 
thinking.  Interestingly, children with ASD show intact delayed self-recognition, which 
may indicate intact temporally extended physical self-awareness.  Thus, individuals with 
ASD may have selective deficits in temporally extended psychological self-awareness.
Despite the accumulating evidence of impairments in psychological aspects of the 
self-concept and higher-order psychological self-awareness in ASD, it seems unlikely 
that impairments in autobiographical episodic memory could be totally accounted for in 
terms of impairments in the self-concept, given that there are additional impairments in 
non-autobiographical episodic memory, which is unlikely to require a self-concept.  
Together, these findings suggest that a diminution in self-awareness can only partially 
explain autobiographical episodic memory impairments in ASD.  It seems likely that 
other factors, such as difficulties with memory binding, also play a role.  Thus, although 
both autobiographical and non-autobiographical episodic memory are impaired in ASD, 
the impairment in the former (which relies on both a self-concept and binding) is likely to 
be more marked than the latter (which relies only on binding).  
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In summary, although memory in ASD is not wholly characterised by an “absent 
self” (cf. Frith, 2003), impairments in psychological aspects of the self-concept are likely 
to result in a reduced capacity for self-referential encoding (at least when psychological 
aspects of self are involved), as well as impaired autobiographical episodic memory and 
future thinking.  These memory deficits are likely to further impact upon the self 
resulting, ultimately, in a diminished temporally extended (psychological) self.   
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